Requiring Broker-Dealers to Disclose Conflicts of Interest: A Solution Protecting and Empowering Investors by Guernsey, Daniel P., Jr.
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
5-6-2019
Requiring Broker-Dealers to Disclose Conflicts of
Interest: A Solution Protecting and Empowering
Investors
Daniel P. Guernsey Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For
more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel P. Guernsey Jr., Requiring Broker-Dealers to Disclose Conflicts of Interest: A Solution Protecting and Empowering Investors, 73 U.
Miami L. Rev. 1029 (2019)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol73/iss3/9
 
 
 
 
 
 1029 
Requiring Broker-Dealers to Disclose 
Conflicts of Interest: A Solution  
Protecting and Empowering Investors 
DANIEL P. GUERNSEY, JR.* 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) instructed the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to analyze the gaps in 
the regulatory regimes of investment advisers and broker-
dealers. After analyzing the differences between the two re-
gimes, the SEC proposed a rule that essentially created a 
fiduciary duty for broker-dealers equivalent to that of invest-
ment advisers. In theory, a uniform fiduciary duty would in-
crease investor protection; however, such a drastic overhaul 
of broker-dealer regulation has attendant consequences. In-
deed, as seen from the federal government’s previous at-
tempts to create a broker-dealer fiduciary duty, increasing 
broker-dealer regulatory requirements limits lower-capital 
investors’ access to investment services. This Note proposes 
that instead of a uniform fiduciary rule, the federal govern-
ment should require broker-dealers to disclose their con-
flicts of interest. This would fill a gap present in investment 
adviser and broker-dealer regulation and increase investor 
protection by allowing investors to make better, more in-
formed decisions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Currently, investment advisers1 and broker-dealers2 are governed 
                                                                                                         
 1 Investment advisers are required to take state-issued exams and can only 
register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 if they hold more than $100 
million in client assets. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT AD-
VISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 84 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/stud-
ies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [hereinafter SEC STUDY]. Investment advisers are re-
quired to go through more rigorous examinations than broker-dealers, and most 
states require them to be bonded if they have discretion over client accounts. Id. 
at 84–86. Investment advisers are also required to have a minimum net capital. Id. 
at 85. “Most investment advisers charge their clients fees based on the percentage 
of assets under management, while others may charge hourly or fixed rates,” 
which can make an adviser’s services more expensive than a broker-dealer’s. Id. 
at iii. 
 2  Broker-dealers are investment professionals that are only required to take 
a state-law exam, usually a Series 63 or Series 66 exam, and register with a self-
regulatory organization such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
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by separate regulatory regimes.3 Each has its own disclosure re-
quirements and standards of care, with those of investment advisers 
typically being more stringent.4 The federal government has been 
paying close attention to these differences and is now trying to har-
monize the regimes by increasing broker-dealer regulation. Indeed, 
the Department of Labor (“DOL”) enacted the Fiduciary Rule, 
which requires all broker-dealers to stand as fiduciaries when giving 
investment advice for retirement accounts.5 Most relevant to this 
Note, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) proposed 
the Regulation Best Interest rule in 2018.6 Both the Fiduciary Rule 
and Regulation Best Interest attempt to require investment advisers 
and broker-dealers to stand as fiduciaries.7 However, such a sweep-
ing overhaul of broker-dealer regulation will greatly increase com-
pliance costs for the industry, which can have adverse effects for 
investors with small capital.8  
This Note proposes that the federal government should not re-
quire broker-dealers to stand as fiduciaries. Instead, meaningful re-
form can be achieved by requiring broker-dealers to disclose their 
conflicts of interest. This approach would impose relatively low 
costs on investors and broker-dealers and can allow investors to 
make better investment decisions. Thus, a conflicts of interest dis-
closure requirement can benefit investors without decreasing access 
to investment services. However, in its current form, disclosure is 
                                                                                                         
(“FINRA”). Id. at 89–90. Moreover, “[m]ost broker-dealers receive transaction-
based compensation.” Id. at iii. The word “broker-dealers” can also be used to 
refer to institutions that buy and sell securities for their own account. Brokers, 
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/brokers (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). For the 
purposes of this Note, the term broker-dealers will refer solely to individuals that 
buy securities on behalf of their customers—for example those acting as an agent 
or acting as a broker. 
 3  See infra Section I.A. 
 4  See infra Section I.A. 
 5  Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 
C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, and 2550). 
 6  Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34–83062, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 21,574 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 7  See infra Parts II, III. 
 8  PINAR ÇEBI WILBER, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION CTR. FOR 
POLICY RESEARCH, DOL’S RETIREMENT ADVICE RULE: HELPING OR HARMING 
SOUND RETIREMENT PLANNING? 11 (2015). 
1032 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1029 
ineffective. Accordingly, any increase in disclosure requirements 
must be accompanied by an overhaul of the form in which disclosure 
is provided to investors. This Note proposes a method for such an 
overhaul based on the current disclosure requirements of investment 
advisers.  
Part I of this Note will begin by diving into the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-
Frank”)—which provides the framework for regulatory action in 
this space—and its requirements. It will then address the SEC Study, 
conducted pursuant to Dodd-Frank, as well as its findings. Parts II 
and III will then discuss the federal government’s responses and pro-
posals from the SEC and DOL relating to regulatory reform for bro-
ker-dealers. Finally, Part IV will argue that requiring broker-dealers 
to disclose their conflicts of interest should be favored and will pre-
sent the manner and form that a conflict of interest disclosure should 
take to be effective. 
I. DODD-FRANK AND THE SEC STUDY 
Under the Obama administration, Congress passed Dodd-Frank 
in part to “protect consumers from abusive financial services prac-
tices.”9 As one commentator noted, 
[i]n enacting Dodd-Frank, Congress was attuned to 
the main issues regarding the different regulatory re-
gimes. It sought input, however, from experts in the 
field before requiring the creation of new or different 
obligations that might adversely impact the econ-
omy, businesses, and important investor choices 
without providing meaningful . . . investor protec-
tion.10  
                                                                                                         
 9  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). For the purposes of clarity, short-form citations are to the Dodd-Frank 
sections rather than the U.S. Code sections. 
 10  James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Analysis of the 
Legal Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and a Framework 
for Enhanced Investor Protection, 68 BUS. LAW. 1, 7 (2012).  
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Dodd-Frank has an entire subtitle focused on improving investor 
protection.11 For instance, this subtitle established the Investor Ad-
visory Committee,12 called for the appointment of the Ombuds-
man,13 and directed the SEC to “analyze the need for enhanced ex-
amination and enforcement resources for investment advisers.”14 
Most pertinent to this Note is section 913 of Dodd-Frank, in which 
Congress orders the SEC to conduct a study on the regulatory re-
gime governing investment advisers and broker-dealers.15 Dodd-
Frank lists fourteen considerations the SEC should consider when 
conducting its study, which boil down to three things: (1) whether 
investors are confused by the current regulatory regimes that govern 
investment advisers and broker-dealers; (2) the impact that any rule-
making may have on retail customers, including the range of prod-
ucts they have access to; and (3) any potential costs that investors or 
broker-dealers may incur as a result of any rulemaking.16 Section 
913(f) of Dodd-Frank then gives the SEC the authority to commence 
any rulemaking necessary to address differences in the regulatory 
regimes for broker-dealers and investment advisers.17 
Pursuant to section 913 of Dodd-Frank, the SEC completed the 
study.18 In its study, the SEC did two things. First, it laid out the 
difference in the standards of conduct that govern investment advis-
ers and broker-dealers.19 Second, it noted that retail investors are 
confused by the differences in those standards of conduct.20  
 
 
                                                                                                         
 11  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 911–
919D.  
 12  Id. § 911. The Investor Advisory Committee is responsible for consulting 
with the SEC on “issues relating to the regulation of securities products, trading 
strategies, and fee structures, and the effectiveness of disclosure,” and “initiatives 
to protect investor interest[s].” Id.  
 13  Id. § 919D. The Ombudsman is the person to whom investors can go when 
they have problems with the commission or agencies such as FINRA. Id.  
 14  Id. § 914(a)(1).  
 15  Id. § 913(b)(1)–(2).  
 16  Id. § 913(c).  
 17  Id. § 913(f).  
 18  See id. § 913(b). 
 19  See SEC STUDY, supra note 1, at 106–09. 
 20  Id. at 101.  
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A. Regulatory Regimes for Investment Advisers  
and Broker-Dealers 
This Section will lay out the different regulatory regimes that 
govern investment advisers and broker-dealers. It will also note how 
the regulatory regimes differ. This information provides the back-
drop for any proposed rulemaking related to investment advisers or 
broker-dealers and how any proposed rulemaking could address the 
gaps in the different regulatory regimes and provide for investor pro-
tection.  
1. INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
The duties of an investment adviser are laid out in the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Investment Advisers Act”).21 Investment ad-
visers are fiduciaries for their clients.22 Interestingly, the Investment 
Advisers Act fails to specifically mention the term “fiduciary duty.” 
23 Instead, the investment adviser’s fiduciary duty arose as a result 
of the interpretation of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 
which, relevant here, contains language preventing “fraudulent, de-
ceptive, or manipulative” practices.24  
In its seminal case on the matter, the Supreme Court in SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. relied upon the committee re-
ports surrounding the Investment Advisers Act to find that the Act 
implied a fiduciary duty for investment advisers.25 According to the 
Supreme Court, “Committee Reports indicate a desire to preserve 
‘the personalized character of the services of investment advisers,’ 
and to eliminate conflicts of interest between the investment adviser 
and the clients as safeguards both to ‘unsophisticated investors’ and 
                                                                                                         
 21  Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2012)). For the purposes of clarity, short-
form citations are to the Investment Advisers Act sections rather than the U.S. 
Code sections.  
 22  See Wrona, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that “the Advisers Act . . . do[es] 
not expressly impose a fiduciary obligation” but that “[t]he courts and the 
SEC . . . have held that the Advisers Act implicitly imposes a fiduciary duty”). 
 23  Id.; see Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §§ 201–24. 
 24  Wrona, supra note 10, at 8–9. 
 25  See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963); 
see also Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979) 
(stating that “the [Investment Advisers] Act’s legislative history leaves no doubt 
that Congress intended to impose enforceable fiduciary obligations”).  
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to ‘bona fide investment counsel.’”26 The Supreme Court then stated 
that due to this language and other language in the committee re-
ports, “[t]he Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a con-
gressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an invest-
ment advisory relationship.’”27  
The fiduciary duty of investment advisers comprises a duty of 
loyalty and a duty of care.28 The duty of loyalty that investment ad-
visers owe to investors has two parts. The first part requires invest-
ment advisers to act in the client’s best interest, “which includes an 
obligation not to subordinate the clients’ interests to [her] own.”29 
The second aspect requires investment advisers to disclose their 
conflicts of interest to clients.30 This disclosure is done through 
Form ADV that is initially given to potential clients.31 Form ADV 
is supposed to be in “plain English.”32 
An investment adviser’s duty of care also has two parts. The first 
part requires investment advisers to provide “suitable investment ad-
vice. To fulfill [this] obligation, an adviser must make a reasonable 
determination that the investment advice provided is suitable for the 
client based on the client’s financial situation and investment objec-
tives.”33 This duty also requires that “an investment ad-
viser . . . make a reasonable investigation to determine that [she] is 
not basing [her] recommendations on materially inaccurate or in-
complete information.”34  
The second prong of an investment adviser’s duty of care re-
quires that the investment adviser seek the best execution for trans-
actions.35 This duty exists “where [investment advisers] have the re-
sponsibility to select broker-dealers to execute client trades (typi-
cally in the case of discretionary accounts).”36 In seeking that best 
                                                                                                         
 26  Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 191 (internal citations 
omitted).  
 27  Id.  
 28  SEC STUDY, supra note 1, at 22.  
 29  Id.  
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. at 18–19. 
 32  Id. at 19 n.71.  
 33  Id. at 27–28. 
 34  Id. at 28. 
 35  Id.  
 36  Id.  
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execution, the investment adviser must execute transactions in “such 
a manner that the client’s total cost or proceeds in each transaction 
are the most favorable under the circumstances.”37   
Aside from the fiduciary duty, investment advisers are subject 
to numerous additional specific requirements. For example, the In-
vestment Advisers Act has special provisions governing registra-
tion,38 advertising,39 supervision,40 and recordkeeping41 for invest-
ment advisers.  
2. BROKER-DEALERS  
In 2007, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(“FINRA”) was created by the merging of the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) and the member regulation, en-
forcement, and arbitration operations of the New York Stock Ex-
change (“NYSE”).42 FINRA is a self-regulatory agency subject to 
the oversight of the SEC.43 FINRA is responsible for the registra-
tion, qualification, licensing, and continuing education requirements 
of broker-dealers.44  
In contrast to the fiduciary duty of investment advisers, broker-
dealer conduct is largely rule-based and only requires that brokers 
make “suitable” investments.45 Sometimes referred to as the “suita-
bility rule,” FINRA Rule 2111 states that a broker-dealer “must have 
a reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or in-
vestment strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the 
customer, based on the information obtained through the reasonable 
diligence of the member or associated person to ascertain the cus-
tomer's investment profile.”46 According to FINRA, “a customer’s 
                                                                                                         
 37  Id. 
 38  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2012).  
 39  Id. § 206(1)–(2); see also SEC STUDY, supra note 1, at 29–30.  
 40  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203. 
 41  Id. § 204.  
 42  Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to 
Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority – FINRA (July 30, 2007), 
http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2007/nasd-and-nyse-member-regulation-com-
bine-form-financial-industry-regulatory-authority.  
 43  Wrona, supra note 10, at 2 n.4. 
 44  Id. at 17–19. 
 45  Id. at 3, 20.  
 46  Wrona, supra note 10, at 23 (citing FINRA Rule 2111(a) (2014)).  
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investment profile includes, but is not limited to, the customer's age, 
other investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, invest-
ment objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, 
liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any other information the cus-
tomer may disclose.”47  
Rule 2111 “codifies . . . three primary suitability obligations: 
reasonable basis, customer-specific, and quantitative suitability.”48 
The reasonable basis obligation requires that a broker “(1) perform 
reasonable diligence to understand the nature of the security or strat-
egy, as well as the potential risks and rewards, and (2) determine 
whether the recommendation is suitable for at least some investors 
based on that understanding.”49 The customer-specific suitability 
obligation is grounded in the second sentence in Rule 2111(a), 
which lays out the factors a broker-dealer must consider before rec-
ommending a security or product.50 Lastly, “[q]uantitative suitabil-
ity requires a member or [broker-dealer] who has actual or de facto 
control over a customer account to have a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that a series of recommended transactions, even if suitable 
when viewed in isolation, are not excessive and unsuitable for the 
customer when taken together.”51 
FINRA Rule 2020, like section 206 of the Investment Advisers 
Act, does not allow broker-dealers to engage in fraudulent practices 
with investors. Specifically, FINRA Rule 2020 states that “[n]o 
[broker-dealer] shall effect any transaction in, or induce the pur-
chase or sale of, any security by means of any manipulative, decep-
tive or other fraudulent device or contrivance.”52 In addition to the 
aforementioned rules, FINRA allocates specific rules to different 
                                                                                                         
 47  Id.; see also FINRA Rule 2090 (2012) (requiring broker-dealers “to know 
(and retain) the essential facts concerning every customer and concerning the au-
thority of each person acting on behalf of such customer”).  
 48  FINRA Rule 2111.05 (2014).  
 49  Wrona, supra note 10, at 24.  
 50  See FINRA Rule 2111(a); see also Wrona, supra note 10, at 24–25. 
 51  FINRA Rule 2111.05(c) (2014). A broker-dealer would have de facto con-
trol over an account if the customer routinely follows the broker-dealer’s advice 
“because the customer is unable to evaluate the broker’s recommendations and 
exercise independent judgment.” Harry Gliksman, Exchange Act Release No. 
42,255, 54 SEC Docket 471, 475 (Dec. 20, 1999). 
 52  FINRA Rule 2020 (2008).  
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products.53 
Unlike investment advisers, broker-dealers do not have exten-
sive requirements for the disclosure of conflicts of interest.54 Indeed, 
there are few rules which govern conflict of interest disclosure re-
quirements for broker-dealers when they are acting as brokers (i.e., 
agents) for their customers.55 For example, FINRA Rule 2232, 
which adopts SEC Rule 10b-10, requires broker-dealers to deliver a 
confirmation to customers at or before the completion of a transac-
tion, meaning that broker-dealers are not required to disclose their 
commissions to investors until a trade is fully executed and irrevo-
cable.56 This confirmation must contain any “remuneration” that a 
broker-dealer will receive as a result of the customer’s transaction.57 
There was an effort in 2004 by the SEC to require disclosure for 
certain products at the time of sale,58 but this rule never made it past 
                                                                                                         
 53  See, e.g., FINRA Rule 2310 (2016) (governing direct participation pro-
grams); FINRA Rule 2320 (2016) (governing variable contracts).  
 54  See Wrona, supra note 10, at 46. 
 55  See, e.g., FINRA Rule 2232 (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a) (2018). 
There are rules for broker-dealers (the members or institutions, as opposed to the 
individuals) when they are acting as principals or dealers. See, e.g., FINRA Rule 
5121(a)(1) (2014). Broker-dealers are also required to disclose material infor-
mation, the omission of which could be considered fraudulent or misleading. See 
FINRA Rule 2020 (2008).  
 56  FINRA Rule 2232 (2018) (incorporating 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)). 
While FINRA Rule 2232 cites Rule 10b-10 as being part of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Rule 10b-10 is technically not part of the Securities Exchange 
Act, but is rather an SEC Rule. I will cite to the C.F.R. when referring to SEC 
Rule 10b-10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a). The time of the transaction is defined as 
“the time of execution . . . of the customer’s order.” Id. § 240.10b-10(d)(3). Exe-
cution is defined as “the point at which the counterparties become irrevocably 
bound to a transaction under applicable law.” Id. § 240.15Fi-1(e). Therefore, un-
der Rule 10b-10, a broker-dealer is not required to disclose her fees until the cus-
tomer is legally bound to the purchase of the security, meaning that the customer 
would not have that information before he or she makes the decision to purchase 
the security. See id. § 240.10b-10(a)(2)(i)(D) (stating that a broker-dealer must 
disclose her fees “at or before” the time of the transaction (emphasis added)). 
 57  Id. § 240.10b-10(a)(2)(i)(D).  
 58  Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements for 
Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, and Other Confirma-
tion Requirement Amendments, and Amendments to the Registration Form for 
Mutual Funds, 69 Fed. Reg. 6438, 6438 (proposed Feb. 10, 2004) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, & 274). 
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the proposal stage.59 
3. KEY DIFFERENCES IN THE REGULATORY REGIMES 
There are two main differences that exist between investment 
adviser and broker-dealer regulation: (1) the duty that each owes 
their customers or clients60 and (2) conflict of interest disclosure re-
quirements.61 The investment adviser’s fiduciary duty is comprised 
in part of a suitability and best interest obligation,62 while broker-
dealers only have suitability obligations.63 In addition, broker-deal-
ers are generally not required to disclose conflicts of interest,64 while 
investment advisers are required to disclose all conflicts through the 
use of a Form ADV.65 Thus, the two pieces of the fiduciary duty that 
broker-dealers lack are the requirement to act in their customer’s 
best interest and to disclose conflicts of interest.  
B. Investor Confusion with the Different Standards of Conduct 
In addition to laying out the different standards of conduct ap-
plicable to investment advisers and broker-dealers, the SEC asked 
                                                                                                         
 59  Cf. Forms Prescribed Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. pt. 239 
(2018); General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 
C.F.R. pt. 240 (2018); Forms Prescribed Under the Investment Company Act of 
1940, 17 C.F.R. pt. 274 (2018). 
 60  SEC STUDY, supra note 1, at 22, 27–28. 
 61  Id. at 26, 29. Some may point out that investment advisers have a duty to 
monitor. See, e.g., Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection Af-
ter the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 59, 89–92 (2010). However, section 913(g)(1) of Dodd-Frank specifi-
cally prevents the SEC from imposing such a duty on broker-dealers. Id. at 91 
(“Section 913(g)(1) of Dodd-Frank states that ‘nothing in this section shall require 
a broker or dealer or registered representative to have a continuing duty of care or 
loyalty to the customer after providing personalized investment advice about se-
curities.’” (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
§ 913(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1) (2012))).  
 62  See supra Section I.A.1. 
 63  See supra Section I.A.2; see also FINRA Rule 2111(a) (2014). Some schol-
ars argue that a “best interest” standard is not part of an investment adviser’s duty 
of care, but is part of an investment adviser’s duty of loyalty governing conflict 
of interest. See, e.g., Black, supra note 61, at 86. Whichever bucket one wishes to 
drop a best interest standard into, there is no rule explicitly requiring a broker-
dealer to act in her client’s best interest. 
 64  See supra Section I.A.2. 
 65  See supra Section I.A.1.  
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investors about their understanding of the differences between these 
two types of financial professionals.66 The SEC sponsored studies 
and surveys to obtain a sense of how investors perceive the stand-
ards of conduct for investment advisers and broker-dealers.67 The 
SEC found that “despite the extensive regulation of both investment 
advisers and broker-dealers, retail customers do not understand and 
are confused by the roles played by investment advisers and broker-
dealers, and more importantly, the standards of care applicable to 
investment advisers and broker-dealers when providing personal-
ized investment advice and recommendations about securities.”68 
While the SEC focused on numerous factors that could potentially 
confuse investors,69 the factor most relevant to this Note is the al-
leged confusion regarding the standards of conduct applicable to in-
vestment advisers and broker-dealers. However, one might question 
the reliability of the SEC’s findings of investor confusion based on 
the studies it used.70  
                                                                                                         
 66  SEC STUDY, supra note 1, at 94–95. 
 67  Id. at 95–101.  
 68  Id. at 101.  
 69  See, e.g., id. at 96 (discussing the different titles used by investment advis-
ers and broker-dealers, and the services offered by the different investment pro-
fessionals as a factor).  
 70  See id. at 95–101 (citing SIEGEL & GALE, LLC & GELB CONSULTING GRP., 
INC., RESULTS OF INVESTOR FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS ABOUT PROPOSED BRO-
KERAGE ACCOUNT DISCLOSURES: REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (2005), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72599/fcrpt03100 
5.pdf [hereinafter SGG REPORT]; ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND INST. FOR 
CIVIL JUSTICE, INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVIS-
ERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
1_randiabdreport.pdf [hereinafter RAND STUDY]; Letter from Barbara Roper, 
Dir. of Inv’r Prot., Consumer Fed’n of Am., & Micah Hauptman, Fin. Servs. 
Counsel, Consumer Fed’n of Am., to Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments/ia-bd-conduct-stand-
ards/cll4-2447346-161075.pdf [hereinafter CFA Survey]). The SGG Report cited 
by the SEC is not reliable and even states, “[d]ue to the dynamic nature of focus 
group interviews, small sample sizes, and group influences on responses, one 
should not conclude that these results are representative of the entire population 
of investors.” SGG REPORT, supra, at 6. In addition, the CFA Survey cited by the 
SEC states that investors are not confused at all by the different standards of con-
duct. CFA Survey, supra, at 7 (“As we have discussed at length in a series of 
comment letters spanning nearly 20 years, the central problem in the market for 
investment advice is not that investors are confused, it’s that investors are being 
actively misled.”). In addition, the Rand Study focused largely on the titles used 
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While the SEC Study is detailed and provides logical support for 
its propositions, some commentators have “acknowledged . . . that 
[it was] not prepared in a vacuum.”71 This is because “[p]olitical 
concerns and public perception—and, to a lesser extent, occasional 
competing perspectives between different regulatory agencies and 
even between different departments within those agencies—can 
sometimes influence how such documents approach issues under 
consideration.”72 This is not to discredit the SEC’s findings. How-
ever, it is useful to note the conditions under which the SEC created 
its study when analyzing the SEC’s findings.73 In fact, after the sub-
mission of the Study, the SEC issued a letter in June 2017 requesting 
comments for a solution to the problem of investor protection, in-
cluding approaches its staff refuted in the SEC Study.74 Ultimately, 
the SEC decided to pursue a best interest rule approach.75 
II. REGULATION BEST INTEREST  
On April 18, 2018, the SEC proposed a rule that would require 
broker-dealers to act in a customer’s best interest when making rec-
ommendations.76 Regulation Best Interest is comprised of two parts: 
a care obligation and a disclosure obligation.77 
                                                                                                         
by different investment professionals, making it hard to determine if investors 
were confused by different titles used by broker-dealers and investment advisers, 
or the many titles used by each. See RAND STUDY, supra, at 109–11.  
 71  Wrona, supra note 10, at 7.  
 72  Id. 
 73  See SEC STUDY, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 74  See Public Statement, Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Public Comments from Retail Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards 
of Conduct for Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-chairman-clayton-2017-
05-31. Some of these approaches included requiring enhanced disclosure, which 
the SEC staff refuted in its study. See SEC STUDY, supra note 1, at ii, 165–66.  
 75  See Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34–83062, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 21,574 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 76  Id. at 21,575, 21,592–95. In this release, the SEC also requested comments 
on its proposal. Id. at 21,574, 21,628–29.  
 77  While Regulation Best Interest states that it is comprised of a care obliga-
tion, a disclosure obligation, and two conflict of interest obligations, the conflict 
of interest obligations are logically and practically subsumed by the disclosure 
obligation because the conflict of interest requirements entail disclosure. See id. 
21,598, 21,617. 
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A. The Care Obligation  
The care obligation of the Regulation Best Interest requires bro-
ker-dealers, when making a recommendation, to 
(1) Understand the potential risks and rewards asso-
ciated with the recommendation, and have a reason-
able basis to believe that the recommendation could 
be in the best interest of at least some retail custom-
ers; (2) have a reasonable basis to believe that the 
recommendation is in the best interest of a particular 
retail customer based on that retail customer’s invest-
ment profile and the potential risks and rewards as-
sociated with the recommendation; and (3) have a 
reasonable basis to believe that a series of recom-
mended transactions, even if in the retail customer’s 
best interest when viewed in isolation, is not exces-
sive and is in the retail customer’s best interest when 
taken together in light of the retail customer’s invest-
ment profile[.]78  
According to the SEC, the care obligation is more demanding than 
a broker’s existing suitability requirements, but “is intended to in-
corporate and enhance existing suitability requirements” rather than 
replace them.79 In addition, Regulation Best Interest “would not re-
quire a broker-dealer to analyze all possible securities, all other 
products, or all investment strategies to recommend the single ‘best’ 
security or investment strategy for the retail customer, nor neces-
sarily require a broker-dealer to recommend the least expensive or 
least remunerative security or investment strategy.”80  
                                                                                                         
 78  Id. at 21,575. The first prong requires broker-dealers to make a reasonable 
inquiry into the strategy or product they are recommending and make sure that the 
strategy or product is suitable for at least some retail customers. Id. at 21,609–10. 
The second prong requires the broker-dealer to put her customer’s interest ahead 
of her own and consider which product is in the best interests of her client, con-
sidering the customer’s investor profile. Id. at 21,611. The third prong requires 
the broker-dealer “to exercise reasonable diligence, care, skill, and prudence” 
when recommending transactions. Id. at 21,613. 
 79  Id. at 21,608–09.  
 80  Id. at 21,609. 
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B. The Disclosure Obligation  
Beyond requiring broker-dealers to act in the best interests of 
their customers, Regulation Best Interest requires broker-dealers to 
disclose material facts to their customers that “relat[e] to the scope 
and terms of the relationship with the retail customer and all material 
conflicts of interest associated with the recommendation.”81 The 
SEC does not provide an exhaustive list of “material facts” that re-
late to the relationship between the broker-dealer and customer.82 
However, the SEC does provide examples of what facts could be 
considered material, including the fact that the broker-dealer is act-
ing as a broker-dealer, the broker-dealer’s conflicts of interest, the 
fees and commissions associated with the customer’s transactions,83 
and the types of services offered by the broker-dealer.84 
Broker-dealers are also required to provide a relationship sum-
mary to investors.85 The relationship summary is to be a four-page 
electronic document called a Form CRS.86 The Form CRS is sup-
posed to abate customer confusion by delineating the standard of 
care that governs the broker-dealer as well as the broker-dealer’s 
fees and any existing conflicts of interest.87 The Form CRS is to be 
delivered when the customer first engages a broker-dealer’s ser-
vices.88 The SEC, however, distinguishes between the Form CRS 
and the disclosure obligations: the former contains general infor-
mation about the broker-dealer, while the disclosure obligation is 
focused on individual recommendations the broker-dealer makes.89  
The SEC does not specifically provide the manner in which a 
broker-dealer must disclose material facts. For example, rather than 
                                                                                                         
 81  Id. at 21,599. This disclosure requirement differs from that under SEC  
Rule 10b-10 because the disclosure here is required at the time of the recommen-
dation by the broker-dealer, and not once the trade or transaction has been exe-
cuted. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.  
 82  See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,600–01. 
 83  Interestingly, the SEC’s fee disclosure requirement is based on “general 
descriptions regarding types of fees and charges, rather than . . . a comprehensive 
or personalized schedule of fees or other information about the amounts, percent-
ages or ranges of fees and charges.” Id. at 21,602.  
 84  Id. at 21,599.  
 85  Id. at 21,600.  
 86  Id. at 21,600 & n.182.  
 87  Id. at 21,600. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. 
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provide the exact form for which broker-dealers must disclose con-
flicts of interest, like the Form ADV used by investment advisers, 
the SEC offers broker-dealers flexibility.90 But, the SEC does man-
date that disclosure be in “plain English,” meaning it should be com-
prised “of short sentences and active voice, and avoid[] . . . legal jar-
gon, highly technical business terms, or multiple negatives.”91 The 
disclosure must also be in writing but can include graphs or charts.92 
It is not entirely clear how Regulation Best Interest is different 
from a uniform fiduciary standard. For instance, as previously noted, 
the key differences between investment advisers and broker-dealers 
are the best interest standard and conflict of interest requirement for 
investment advisers.93 Because Regulation Best Interest compels 
both a best interest standard, through its care obligation, and a con-
flict of interest requirement, through its disclosure obligation, for 
broker-dealers, it essentially creates a fiduciary duty for broker-
dealers, without using so few words.94  
Regulation Best Interest is not the only federal government re-
sponse to the differences between investment adviser and broker-
dealer regulation. The DOL also took action in 2010, attempting to 
harmonize the standard of conduct between investment advisers and 
broker-dealers by requiring broker-dealers to stand as fiduciaries.95 
III. THE FIDUCIARY RULE 
In 2010, the DOL first proposed requiring all financial profes-
sionals giving advice for individual retirement accounts (“IRAs”) or 
employer-sponsored retirement plans to stand as fiduciaries.96 Prior 
                                                                                                         
 90  Id. at 21,605 (“[W]e preliminarily believe that broker-dealers should have 
the flexibility to make disclosures by various means (e.g., different types of dis-
closure documents), as opposed to requiring a single standard written docu-
ment.”).  
 91  Id. at 21,604.  
 92  Id.  
 93  See supra Section I.A.3. 
 94  Of course, differences between broker-dealers and investment advisers still 
exist, such as registration and examination requirements. See supra notes 1–2 and 
accompanying text.  
 95  See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,263–64 
(Oct. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). This rule adds broker-deal-
ers to the definition of “fiduciary,” under the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (2018).  
 96  Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,263–64.  
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to 2010, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (“ERISA”)97 only financial professionals rendering invest-
ment advice for employer-sponsored retirement plans have fiduciary 
duties, while those who issue investment advice to IRAs do not.98 
Under section 3(21)(A) of ERISA,  
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the 
extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control respecting management of such 
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting 
management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he ren-
ders investment advice for a fee or other compensa-
tion, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or 
other property of such plan, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretion-
ary authority or discretionary responsibility in the ad-
ministration of such plan. Such term includes any 
person designated under section 405(c)(1)(B).99 
The DOL withdrew the 2010 Fiduciary Rule in September 2011, 
in response to public outcry,100 and re-proposed its Fiduciary Rule 
in 2015. On February 23, 2015, President Obama gave a speech at 
AARP where he stated, “today, I’m calling on the Department of 
Labor to update the rules and requirements that retirement advisors 
put the best interests of their clients above their own financial inter-
ests.  It’s a very simple principle:  You want to give financial advice, 
you’ve got to put your client’s interests first.”101 On April 20, 2015, 
                                                                                                         
 97  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 
93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). For the 
purposes of clarity, short-form citations are to the ERISA sections rather than the 
U.S. Code sections. 
 98  See id. § 4(a) (“[T]his title shall apply to any employee benefit plan . . . .”).  
 99  Id. § 3(21)(A). “Plan” is used to include only employer sponsored plans. 
Id. at § 3(2)(A).  
 100  David A. Pratt, Focus on . . . Lawsuits Challenging the Department of La-
bor’s Fiduciary Rule, J. PENSION BENEFITS, Autumn 2016, at 4, 5.  
 101  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the AARP (Feb. 23, 
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/23/re-
marks-president-aarp.   
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the DOL re-proposed its fiduciary rule.102 The DOL stated,  
If adopted, the [2015] proposal would treat persons 
who provide investment advice or recommendations 
to an employee benefit plan, plan fiduciary, plan par-
ticipant or beneficiary, IRA, or IRA owner as fiduci-
aries under ERISA and the Code in a wider array of 
advice relationships than the existing ERISA and 
Code regulations.103 
Closely related to the Fiduciary Rule, Congress proposed a Best 
Interest Contract (“BIC”) Exemption.104 “ERISA and the Code gen-
erally prohibit fiduciaries from receiving payments from third par-
ties and from acting on conflicts of interest, including using their 
authority to affect or increase their own compensation, in connection 
with transactions involving a plan or IRA.”105 Therefore, anyone 
who is a fiduciary under ERISA cannot accept common fees, such 
as commissions, 12b-1 fees, and revenue sharing payments.106 How-
ever, the BIC Exemption allows fiduciaries to receive these fees 
when making a recommendations, although the fiduciary must  
• Acknowledge fiduciary status with respect to invest-
ment advice to the Retirement Investor; 
• Adhere to Impartial Conduct Standards requiring 
them to: 
○ Give advice that is in the Retirement Investor's 
Best Interest (i.e., prudent advice that is based on 
the investment objectives, risk tolerance, finan-
cial circumstances, and needs of the Retirement 
Investor, without regard to financial or other in-
terests of the Adviser, Financial Institution, or 
their Affiliates, Related Entities or other parties); 
○ Charge no more than reasonable compensation; 
                                                                                                         
 102  See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retire-
ment Investment Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,928 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509 & 2510). 
 103  Id. at 21,928.  
 104  Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002, 21,002 (Apr. 8, 
2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).  
 105  Id.  
 106  Id.  
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and 
○ Make no misleading statements about investment 
transactions, compensation, and conflicts of in-
terest; 
• Implement policies and procedures reasonably and 
prudently designed to prevent violations of the Im-
partial Conduct Standards; 
• Refrain from giving or using incentives for Advisers 
to act contrary to the customer's best interest; and 
• Fairly disclose the fees, compensation, and Material 
Conflicts of Interest, associated with their recom-
mendations.107 
 
The BIC Exemption had an applicability date of April 10, 2017.108 
Finally, on April 8, 2016, the DOL published a final rule that 
requires anyone giving investment advice to IRAs to stand as a fi-
duciary.109 However, the applicability date of the Fiduciary Rule 
was pushed forward to June 9, 2017.110 In addition, the DOL 
changed the applicability date of the BIC Exmpetion, creating a 
transition period through January 1, 2018.111 Three months before 
implementation, President Trump issued a memorandum.112 In his 
memorandum, President Trump wrote that the DOL’s fiduciary rule 
                                                                                                         
 107  Id. at 21,007. Essentially, the BIC Exemption allows investors with IRAs 
to have a contract in writing through which they can bring a breach of contract 
claim against fiduciaries that they believe wronged them. See id. at 21,008.  
 108  Id. at 21,069. 
 109  Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 
29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, & 2550).  
 110  Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice; Best Interest Contract Exemption (Prohibited Transaction Ex-
emption 2016–01); Class Exemption for Principal Transactions in Certain Assets 
Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs 
(Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2016–02); Prohibited Transaction Exemp-
tions 75–1, 77–4, 80–83, 83–1, 84–24 and 86–128, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,902, 16,902 
(Apr. 7, 2017) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
 111  Id.  
 112  See Memorandum from President Donald Trump to the Sec’y of Labor 
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule/. 
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may significantly alter the manner in which Ameri-
cans can receive financial advice, and may not be 
consistent with the policies of my Administration. 
. . . .  
. . . [The DOL is] directed to examine the Fiduci-
ary Duty Rule to determine whether it may adversely 
affect the ability of Americans to gain access to re-
tirement information and financial advice. As part of 
this examination, you shall prepare an updated eco-
nomic and legal analysis concerning the likely im-
pact of the Fiduciary Duty Rule . . . .113 
While the fiduciary aspect of the rule was implemented,114 the 
DOL pushed back the BIC Exemption applicability date again. On 
November 29, 2017, the DOL extended the applicability date of the 
BIC Exemption by eighteen months, pushing the applicability date 
to July 1, 2019.115 The DOL stated that, “[t]he primary purpose of 
the amendments is to give the Department of Labor the time neces-
sary to consider public comments under the criteria set forth in the 
Presidential Memorandum of February 3, 2017, including whether 
possible changes and alternatives to these exemptions would be ap-
propriate.”116 Interestingly, Mercury Analytics conducted a survey 
in 2017 and found that many comments critical to the fiduciary rule 
were fake.117  
                                                                                                         
 113  Id. 
 114  See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (2018).  
 115  18-Month Extension of Transition Period and Delay of Applicability 
Dates; Best Interest Contract Exemption (PTE 2016–01); Class Exemption for 
Principal Transactions in Certain Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries 
and Employee Benefit Plans and IRAs (PTE 2016–02); Prohibited Transaction 
Exemption 84–24 for Certain Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Bro-
kers, Pension Consultants, Insurance Companies, and Investment Company Prin-
cipal Underwriters (PTE 84–24), 82 Fed. Reg. 56,545, 56,545 (Nov. 29, 2017) (to 
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (noting that the DOL is extending “the special 
transition period under section II and IV of the Best Interest Contract Exemp-
tion . . . to July 1, 2019”).  
 116  Id.  
 117  James V. Grimaldi & Paul Overberg, Many Comments Critical of ‘Fiduci-
ary’ Rule Are Fake, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 27, 2017, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/many-comments-critical-of-fiduciary-rule-are-
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Given the continuing delays, industry opposition, and this recent 
finding of fake comments, a question remains open as to whether 
the Fiduciary Rule will ever take effect in all its parts.118 In fact, it 
seems the Fiduciary Rule may be unconstitutional as the rule was 
struck down in its entirety by the Fifth Circuit.119 
IV. A CONFLICT OF INTEREST FOCUSED APPROACH   
Conflicts of interest plague investment advice in this country. 
To quote former President Obama, “bad advice that results from 
conflicts of interest costs middle-class and working families about 
$17 billion a year.”120 However, our wallets are not the only thing 
affected by conflicted investment advice. When broker-dealers give 
conflicted investment advice, “it offends [this country’s] basic val-
ues of honesty and fair play.”121 Therefore, a conflicts of interest 
disclosure requirement can go a long way. Rather than adding a dis-
closure requirement and best interest standard for broker-dealers at 
the detriment of lower-income investors, the federal government 
should require a conflicts of interest disclosure requirement when 
broker-dealers render investment advice. This approach would pro-
vide meaningful regulatory reform as it allows investors to make 
better investment decisions without substantially raising compliance 
costs.   
A. The Cost of Regulatory Compliance   
The harm to lower-capital investors caused by Regulation Best 
                                                                                                         
fake-1514370601 (finding that “[m]any of the comments weren’t written by the 
people they were attributed to”). 
 118  There was a bill introduced by the House of Representatives aimed at to-
tally removing the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule, but it was never enacted. See PASS Act 
of 2017, H.R. 3857, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 119  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 388 
(5th Cir. 2018) (striking the Fiduciary Rule in its entirety). While a recent Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision seemingly created a circuit split, the Tenth Cir-
cuit’s holding does not address the Fiduciary Rule as a whole, but only the issue 
of whether the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) by preventing investment professionals selling fixed indexed annuities 
from receiving commissions. Mkt. Synergy Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 
F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir. 2018). The court held that the DOL’s exclusion did not 
violate the APA. Id. at 683–85. 
 120  President Barack Obama, supra note 101.   
 121  Id. 
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Interest is not immediately apparent. Indeed, at first glance, a rule 
requiring broker-dealers to put their customers’ interests first should 
be favored.122 However, with every increase in regulation there is a 
requisite increase in compliance costs.123 In the case of Regulation 
Best Interest, the increase in broker-dealer regulation will lead to 
increased compliance costs for broker-dealers.124 Because Regula-
tion Best Interest essentially creates a fiduciary duty for broker-deal-
ers,125 one can infer that its costs will be similar to that of a uniform 
fiduciary rule, such as the Fiduciary Rule.126 While Regulation Best 
Interest could not calculate the costs for its implementation,127 a 
study has demonstrated that a uniform fiduciary standard can cost 
the industry upwards of $4 billion.128  
The cost of increased regulation will likely not be swallowed by 
broker-dealers.129 Requiring a uniform fiduciary standard may force 
                                                                                                         
 122  See, e.g., id. 
 123  See WILBER, supra note 8, at 11 (“The prospect of increased recordkeeping 
and paperwork for compliance purposes, as well as the possible increase in litiga-
tion volumes, will push up the cost for brokerage services, making them uneco-
nomical, especially for small account sizes.”). 
 124  See id. 
 125  See supra Part II. 
 126  See supra notes 96–103 and accompanying text. In fact, it may even exceed 
the cost of the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule because the DOL’s fiduciary rule only per-
tains to advice for retirement accounts. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (2018). Be-
cause Regulation Best Interest has no such limitation, it would apply to advice for 
all customer accounts and therefore impose costs on a larger amount of accounts 
than the Fiduciary Rule.  
 127  Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34–83062, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 21,574, 21,648 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 128  Bruce Kelly, DOL Fiduciary Rule Compliance Costs Exceed $4.7 Billion: 
SIFMA Study, INVESTMENT NEWS (Aug. 10, 2017, 2:00 PM), http://www.invest-
mentnews.com/article/20170810/FREE/170819991/dol-fiduciary-rule-compli-
ance-costs-exceed-4-7-billion-sifma-study?mod=article_inline (finding that a 
new Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”) study pro-
jected the DOL’s fiduciary rule to cost $4.7 billion as opposed to the $2 billion 
cited by the DOL).  
 129  See WILBER, supra note 8, at 11. One study found that compliance costs 
could increase anywhere from 73% to 196% on average. OLIVER WYMAN, MARSH 
& MCLENNAN COS., THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS IN THE US RETIREMENT 
MARKET 7 (2015), https://www.napa-net.org/sites/napa-net.org/files/uploads/ 
2015.07.13-Oliver-Wyman-Report.pdf. 
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broker-dealers to change their business models to respond to height-
ened standards of care.130 In such instances, broker-dealers are dis-
couraged from taking clients with small capital because they will 
not be compensated sufficiently for providing advice.131 For exam-
ple, suppose a broker charged a two percent (2%) flat fee for her 
services instead of fluctuating commissions based on the products 
she sells. In the flat fee scenario, she will naturally be more willing 
to provide advice to someone with $1 million in capital than some-
one with $200,000 in capital. Our broker-dealer will not likely offer 
her services to the investor with $200,000 at all. This is because she 
will earn $20,000 from her customer with $1 million to invest, but 
only $4,000 from her customer with $200,000 to invest. However, 
if our broker-delaer makes varying commissions on different prod-
ucts and her $200,000 customer wants a product that offers a ten 
percent (10%) commission, she will be more willing to offer ser-
vices to that customer because our broker-dealer would make 
$20,000 in commissions. The flat fee approach leaves investors with 
two choices: (1) go to fly-by-night, or so-called “cockroach firms,” 
                                                                                                         
 130  See, e.g., Laura J. Keller, BofA Weighs Allowing Commissions on Merrill 
Lynch Retirement Accounts, BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2018, 1:26 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-15/bofa-weighs-allowing-
commissions-on-merrill-retirement-accounts (stating that Merrill Lynch restruc-
tured most of its retirement accounts after the Fiduciary Rule by making them fee-
based, meaning they charge customers a percentage of their assets as a fee); Greg 
Lacurci, DOL Fiduciary Rule Pushing Broker-Dealer Assets to Fee-Based Ac-
counts, away from Commissions, INVESTMENT NEWS (May 24, 2017, 2:43 PM), 
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170524/FREE/170529958/dol-fidu-
ciary-rule-pushing-broker-dealer-assets-to-fee-based (noting that in the wake of 
the Fiduciary Rule, fee-based accounts increased for Morgan Stanley by 219% in 
one quarter, Raymond James by 33% in one quarter, and Kovack Securities by 
21% in one year); see also Letter from Marc R. Bryant, Senior Vice President, 
Fidelity Invs. to Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 11, 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments/ia-bd-conduct-standards/cll4-2216673-
160638.pdf  (“[W]e have observed the large number of companies consider-
ing . . . switching to investment advisor fee-based arrangements because of the 
DOL Fiduciary Advice Rule, . . . which . . . we believe will ultimately make it 
harder and more expensive for retail investors to get the advice they need . . . .”).  
 131  For an argument that fee-based accounts will not cost investors more 
money, see CFA Survey, supra note 70, at 72. 
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who aim for quantity not quality;132 or (2) turn to self-trading plat-
forms, such as E-Trade.133 In either case, the investor is either re-
ceiving poor advice or none at all, which can negatively affect their 
portfolio performance by at least 3.3%.134 
In contrast, given the significantly lower costs for implementing 
a conflict of interest disclosure requirement, firms are less likely to 
completely overhaul their payment regimes and squeeze out inves-
tors with small capital. Costs associated with requiring conflict of 
interest disclosures are the costs of the due diligence for and prepa-
ration of the disclosure provided to investors.135 The SEC did a cost 
analysis and determined that it would cost an initial $1.39 million 
and a subsequent aggregate annual cost of $460.81 million to imple-
ment its disclosure requirements, which include in the analysis more 
than a conflict of interest disclosure.136 Therefore, one could expect 
the cost of requiring broker-dealers to only disclose conflicts of in-
terest to be slightly less than that amount. While it is unlikely this 
amount would be regarded as insignificant, it is notably less than the 
estimated cost associated with regulating broker-dealer standards of 
conduct, which was upwards of $4 billion.137  
Further, a conflicts of interest disclosure requirement will not 
squeeze out lower-capital investors. For one, broker-dealers are al-
ready required to disclose conflicts of interest to investors, albeit 
only after the transaction is binding.138 My proposal simply requires 
                                                                                                         
 132  See Mason Braswell, FINRA Cracks Down on ‘Cockroach’ Brokers, IN-
VESTMENT NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015, 1:31 PM), https://www.investment-
news.com/article/20150915/FREE/150919947/finra-cracks-down-on-cockroach-
brokers. 
 133  Trading Platforms, E-TRADE, https://us.etrade.com/platforms (last vis-
ited Apr. 24, 2019). 
 134  See OLIVER WYMAN & SIFMA, STANDARD OF CARE HARMONIZATION IM-
PACT ASSESSMENT FOR SEC 31 (2010), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/05/study-standard-of-care-harmonization-impact-assessment-for-
sec.pdf (noting that “[p]articipants in 401k plans administered by Schwab 
achieved returns that were 3.3% higher on average if some level of financial ad-
vice was provided”).  
 135  See Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34–83062, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 21,574, 21,650 & n.478 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 240). 
 136  Id. at 21,650 & n.479. 
 137  See Kelly, supra note 128; supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.  
 138  See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
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this disclosure to occur at the time of a recommendation rather than 
after consummation of the transaction. Thus, it is unlikely to force 
broker-dealers to completely overhaul fee-structures to save compli-
ance costs. In addition, some broker-dealers, such as Merrill Lynch, 
have reconsidered their decision to shift to fee-based brokerage ser-
vices in the wake of a “lighter regulatory climate in the Trump 
era.”139 Given the lighter regulatory burden that accompanies a dis-
closure-only requirement, one could expect to see a halt in the trend 
of shifting to fee-based services, which is what is driving out lower-
income investors.140 
B. Informed Decision Making  
A conflicts of interest requirement can allow investors to make 
better investment decisions. The heart of the existing problem be-
tween brokers and investors is simple and perhaps best explained by 
what economists call “information asymmetry.”141 When infor-
mation asymmetry exists, a broker-dealer can take advantage of an 
investor’s inability to properly assess the quality of the product 
shown to her.142 In the broker-dealer/investor relationship, investors 
tend to have less information about the stocks they are purchasing 
and come to broker-dealers for their expertise.143 Investors often rely 
on the broker for critical information when investing and therefore 
any misinformation the broker gives to the investor comes at a det-
riment to the investor.144 Under the current regulatory framework, 
when a broker-dealer’s interests are not in-line with an investor’s—
perhaps because a broker-dealer will receive a huge commission 
from a sale—investors would not have knowledge of this misalign-
ment because broker-dealers are not currently required to disclose 
conflicts of interest until it is too late.145 By bringing a broker-
                                                                                                         
 139  Keller, supra note 130.  
 140  See id.; supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.  
 141  See Debi Prasad Mishra et al., Information Asymmetry and Levels of 
Agency Relationships, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 277, 277 (1998) (explaining that in-
formation asymmetry occurs when the seller of a product has more information 
than the buyer of the product). In the investor/broker-dealer relationship, the bro-
ker-dealer would be the seller and the investor would be the buyer.  
 142  See id. 
 143  See id. at 277–78.   
 144  See id. 
 145  See supra Section I.A. 
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dealer’s conflicts to the forefront, investors can note when their bro-
ker-dealer’s interests diverge from their own and use this infor-
mation when deciding whether to heed their broker-dealer’s advice.  
Indeed, while studies focusing on the effectiveness of conflict of 
interest disclosures have provided mixed results, one study per-
formed in the investment context shows that conflict of interest dis-
closures can allow investors to make better investment decisions by 
accounting for this divergence of interest.146 That study showed that 
requiring disclosure of conflicts of interest can reduce the amount of 
money that investors place in risky investments.147 In their experi-
ment, the researchers used 484 subjects from the Czech Republic, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom.148 Subjects were given invest-
ment advice from either advisers with a conflict of interest or from 
advisers without a conflict of interest.149 In Task A1 of the study, 
some advisers knew about the ultimate success or failure of the se-
curities from which the subjects would choose.150 Regardless of 
whether the advisors knew the outcome of the investment in ad-
vance, they could deceive the subjects if they wished.151 The sub-
jects were given the equivalent of €10,000 to invest in increments of 
€1,000.152 The investors needed to decide how much to invest in 
risky investments using advise provided by conflicted advisers.153 
The study revealed that subjects invested about €900.00 less when 
their adviser disclosed her conflict of interest.154 The researchers 
found that when there is a full disclosure of conflicts of interest, 
“advisees exhibit substantial care when they know their advisor is 
biased.”155 
                                                                                                         
 146  See CHATER ET AL., CONSUMER DECISION-MAKING IN RETAIL INVEST-
MENT SERVICES: A BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 360 (2010), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/retail_investment_services_2010_en.pdf.  
 147  Id. Risk was determined from a control experiment where subjects chose 
how to invest their money without any assistance. Id. at 357.  
 148  Id. at 345. 
 149  Id. at 347–48.  
 150  Id. at 350. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. at 349. 
 153  Id. at 349–50. 
 154  Id. at 360.  
 155  Id. at 359. Although another task studied in the same report found that in-
vestors were likely to place less money in optimal investments when advisers dis-
closed conflicts of interest, this does not refute the original study’s findings. Id. at 
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Another study conducted by Sah and Loewenstein suggests that 
disclosure of conflicts of interest can be effective.156 Sah and Loe-
wenstein ran an experiment with 101 advisors in which there was a 
30 x 30 grid of dots.157 The advisors knew that there were 455 dots 
on the grid that were filled in and the rest were blank.158 The subjects 
were given a 3 x 3 grid with some dots filled in and were asked to 
guess the number of dots filled in the larger grid, with the help of 
the advisor.159 The advisors were allowed to choose a reward struc-
ture, either receiving $5 if the subject guessed the number of dots 
within ten or $10 if the subject gave an estimate of 100 dots above 
the actual correct number.160 There were two experiments, one in 
which the advisor’s conflict would be disclosed and one in which it 
would not.161 Sixty-three percent (63%) of the advisors in the non-
disclosure group chose the $10 structure, while only thirty-three per-
cent (33%) in the disclosure structure chose the $10 reward struc-
ture.162 The results found that advice was more biased in the non-
disclosure group, meaning the average for dots guessed was higher 
(M = 62.12 dots vs. M = 7.85 dots).163 
Sah and Loewenstein found that disclosing conflicts can be ben-
eficial to advisees by focusing on the conduct of the individuals 
making the disclosure, as opposed to the conduct of customers or 
                                                                                                         
370–71. This phenomenon was only an effect seen when advisers had a conflict 
with one investment, Investment F, and that conflict was aligned with the ad-
visee’s incentives. Id. (“[W]hen the advisor is biased to recommend Investment F 
(i.e. has aligned incentives), advisees trust their advice less than the same advice 
from unbiased advisors, investing almost €1,600 less in the optimal investment.”) 
However, when advisers had a conflict with a different investment, Investment P, 
advisees invested more money in optimal investments when advisers disclosed 
their conflicts of interests and that conflict was adversely aligned with the ad-
visee’s incentives. Id. at 371 (“When the advisor is biased to recommend Invest-
ment P (i.e. has adversely-aligned incentives), advisees invested around €1,800 
more in the optimal investment.”). 
 156  Sunita Sah & George Loewenstein, Nothing to Declare: Mandatory and 
Voluntary Disclosure Leads Advisors to Avoid Conflicts of Interest, 25 PSYCOL. 
SCI. 575, 583 (2014).  
 157  Id. at 576–77. 
 158  Id. at 577. 
 159  Id. at 576–77. 
 160  Id. 577. 
 161  Id. at 578.  
 162  Id.  
 163  Id. “M” means “mean” or “average.”  
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buyers.164 According to Sah and Loewenstein, people are averse to 
being viewed as corrupt.165 Because people do not like being viewed 
as biased, people will avoid conflicts of interest if they have to dis-
close them, which “encourage[es] low-quality providers to improve 
quality or exit the market.”166  
However, there are some studies showing that disclosing con-
flicts of interests can have an adverse effect. For example, Cain, 
Loewenstein, and Moore conducted an experiment with 147 under-
graduate students at Carnegie Mellon University.167 Participants 
were either estimators or advisers.168 The estimators were required 
to guess the value of coins in a jar with the help of the advisers, who 
submitted suggestions of how much money was in the jar based on 
their own observations and the information provided to them that 
was not provided to advisors.169 “In a control treatment, advisors, 
like estimators, were paid more when estimators answered accu-
rately. This alignment of incentives was disclosed.”170 There was 
also two conflict of interest scenarios where advisers would be paid 
more if estimators overestimated the total value of coins in the jar.171 
The researchers conducted this study in one instance where this con-
flict was disclosed and another where the conflict was not.172 The 
results were as follows: “[E]stimators earned less money when con-
flicts of interest were disclosed than when they were not, and advi-
sors made more money with disclosure than without disclosure. In 
addition, estimators made the most money . . . [when] there was no 
conflict of interest.”173 
The researchers explain their results through two phenomena. 
First, they argue that disclosing conflicts of interest creates a moral 
license for the disclosing party.174 According to Cain, disclosing 
                                                                                                         
 164  Id. at 582.  
 165  Id.  
 166  Id. However, Sah and Loewenstein found that disclosure is not as effective 
in situations in which conflicts of interest are unavoidable. Id.  
 167  Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of 
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (2005). 
 168  Id. at 8. 
 169  Id. at 8–9.  
 170  Id. at 8.  
 171  Id. 
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conflicts of interests can create a problem by “reducing advisors’ 
feelings of guilt about misleading estimators and thereby giving ad-
visors a moral license to bias advice even further than they would 
without disclosure.”175  
The second problem with disclosure builds off this moral licens-
ing. The researchers argued that when conflicts of interests are dis-
closed, advisees cannot sufficiently discount the effect of the moral 
licensing.176 The researchers even argued that “in some circum-
stances, disclosure may even lead estimators to put greater weight 
on biased advice.”177  
The studies I analyzed come to different results in their attempt 
to determine the effectiveness of disclosing conflicts of interests. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that these studies were con-
ducted in controlled settings with consequences that do not extend 
beyond the parameters of the experiment. In real life, broker-dealers 
are faced with external pressures, such as lawsuits and regulatory 
oversight, and as noted by Hung, Gong, and Burke, “the monetary 
incentive, the cognitive load, and the decision environment are very 
different when people are estimating the value of a jar of coins as 
opposed to when they are making a financial decision regarding re-
tirement.”178 Moreover, the only study involving investments sug-
gested that disclosing conflicts of interest can reduce the amount of 
money people place in more risky products.179  
The disclosure of conflicts of interest is only effective to the ex-
tent that investors can gauge how much of a conflict actually exists. 
This next section will propose how conflicts of interests should be 
disclosed if such disclosure is to be impactful.  
                                                                                                         
 175  Id. at 7. 
 176  Id. at 22. 
 177  Id. at 6. In another study, Sah, Loewenstein, and Cain argue that disclosing 
conflicts of interests can reduce the trust that advisees places on the advice, but 
that the disclosure increases the pressure to comply with the advice. Sunita Sah, 
George Loewenstein & Daylian M. Cain, The Burden of Disclosure: Increased 
Compliance with Distrusted Advice, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 289 
(2013).  
 178  ANGELA A. HUNG, MIN GONG & JEREMY BURKE, EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES 
IN FINANCIAL DECISIONMAKING 9 (2015).  
 179   CHATER ET AL., supra note 146, at 360.  
1058 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1029 
C. The Form of Disclosure  
1. PREVIOUS EXAMPLES OF EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURE  
Before I propose how a broker should disclose her conflicts of 
interest, I believe it useful to lay out two situations in other indus-
tries where disclosure proved effective. I will then base my recom-
mendation on these successful disclosures.  
The first example of effective disclosure is the Bridgestone/Fire-
stone scandal in 2000. In 2000, Bridgestone/Firestone was respon-
sible for a series of tire blowouts that caused vehicles to roll over.180 
This tire scandal revealed that the SUVs people thought were safer 
were actually more likely to roll over than the smaller cars.181 More-
over, some SUVs were more likely than others to roll over.182 Most 
of the public did not know this, despite the fact that rollovers were 
responsible for almost one-third of auto fatalities in the United 
States.183 In November of 2000, the Transportation Recall Enhance-
ment, Accountability, and Documentation (“TREAD”) Act 
“[r]equired auto companies for the first time to give car buyers the 
facts about each model’s rollover risks so that they could make their 
own safety choices.”184 Congress implemented a five-star rating sys-
tem, where each star would represent a range of probabilities of an 
SUV rolling over.185 In a single-vehicle crash, five stars indicated 
that a vehicle had a ten percent (10%) or less chance of rolling over, 
while a one-star vehicle had a forty percent (40%) chance of rolling 
over.186 Moreover, a few years later, this information was required 
to be presented on showroom new-car stickers.187  
This system of disclosure was very effective in refining vehicle 
design and reducing rollover risks.188 When Congress first enacted 
TREAD, there was only one SUV model that received a four-star 
                                                                                                         
 180  ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF 
TRANSPARENCY 1 (2007). 
 181  Id. at 2.  
 182  Id.  
 183  Id. at 1–2. 
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 187  Id. at 4.  
 188  Id. at 2, 4. 
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rating, while thirty models received a one- or two-star rating.189 But 
by 2005, twenty-four models received a four-star rating and only 
one model received a two-star rating.190 According to some, this 
method of disclosure proved effective because the information was 
presented in a user-centered manner that allowed “car buyers, re-
gardless of their math or language skills, [to] compare risks and 
identify rollover-prone models.”191 
Another example of effective disclosure involves the disclosure 
of hygiene inspections in Los Angeles County. In many areas 
around the country, “public health inspectors visit restaurants to 
make sure they comply with local hygiene codes.”192 However, in 
an overwhelming number of communities, the information and hy-
giene reports gathered are stored in government files that are not 
readily available to the public.193  
However, in Los Angeles County, restaurants have been re-
quired to post their hygiene ratings in their window since 1998.194 
In order to simplify the rating system so that the public could under-
stand, restaurants must place a letter from “A” to “C” in their win-
dow to reflect their hygiene status, where an A-rating represents a 
cleaner restaurant than a C-rating.195 Unlike other counties that are 
not required to post this information in an easily digestible form, 
“[a] glance at the restaurant’s storefront tells them how clean it 
is.”196 
The posting of these hygiene ratings had a positive impact 
on the overall cleanliness of restaurants in Los Angeles County. Ac-
cording to one study, the implementation of this grading system led 
to a reduction in food-related illnesses and created economic incen-
tives for good quality hygiene. 197 Another study agreed with these 
findings and reported that this grading program was “associated 
                                                                                                         
 189  Id. at 4.  
 190  Id.  
 191  Id. at 2.  
 192  Id. at 50.  
 193  Id. In some areas, “results are posted in searchable electronic databases that 
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 194  Id.  
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 197  Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Case in Support of Restaurant Hy-
giene Grade Cards, CHOICES, 2nd Quarter 2005, at 97, 98–99.  
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with a 13.1 percent decrease in the number of people hospitalized 
with food-borne diseases.”198 
2. DISCUSSION  
The SUV safety ratings and the hygiene ratings shed some light 
on what any conflict of interest disclosure should look like and how 
it can be effective. Specifically, there are two things that these ex-
amples highlight.  
First, any potential disclosure must be simplified. For instance, 
SUV ratings were helpful to consumers because they simplified the 
likelihood that an SUV would roll over.199 Instead of providing con-
sumers with all the complicated factors that would make an SUV 
more likely to roll over, the ratings combine a plethora of factors to 
create a probability that any given SUV would roll over.200 Like-
wise, restaurants had to present their hygiene ratings in Los Angeles 
using letter grades from “A” to “C” that are easily understood, rather 
than disclose everything that made the restaurant more or less hy-
gienic.201  
Second, the form of disclosure must be comparative. In the SUV 
rollover example, the probability of a rollover was not listed as a 
percentage, but on a scale of 1 to 5 stars.202 Consumers might not be 
able to understand that a forty-one percent (41%) chance of rolling 
over was one of the worst probabilities. But, as the results show, 
consumers can understand that a one-star rating is the worst rating a 
vehicle could have.203 In the hygiene example, the decrease in food-
related illnesses and decrease in food-related hospitalization shows 
that customers were able to easily distinguish between “A” quality 
restaurants and “C” quality restaurants.204 This would likely not be 
the case if consumers had to call the health inspector’s office, ask 
about all the health code violations, and compare these violations 
amongst restaurants. 
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I propose that a broker-dealer’s conflicts of interest should be 
disclosed in a manner similar to how investment advisers disclose 
their advisory fees. For example, if an investment adviser charges 
an advisory fee over two percent (2%), she must disclose “that [her] 
fee is higher than that normally charged in the industry and that other 
investment advisers provide the same or similar services at lower 
rates” or be in violation of the antifraud provisions of the Investment 
Advisers Act.205 However, in the broker-dealer context, conflicts of 
interest disclosure should be tailored to the services the broker-
dealer provides.  
First, instead of disclosing that a lower fee may be charged by 
another broker-dealer, any disclosure should state that the fee 
charged by a broker-dealer may be influencing her investment ad-
vice. In essence, a broker-dealer would want to make more money 
and thus, will be inclined to sell the product with the largest com-
mission.206 In addition, products with higher commissions tend to be 
riskier investments than those with low commissions.207 The misa-
lignment of interests and the fact that products with higher commis-
sions can carry more risk leaves the investor with a potentially dis-
astrous product and a broker-dealer with a large commission. There-
fore, the proposed broker-dealer conflicts of interest disclosure 
would disclose the potential for the broker-dealer’s bias based on 
the size of her commission.208 
Second, the average broker-dealer commission for all products 
needs to be disclosed. This is another departure from the investment 
                                                                                                         
 205  The Consultant Publications Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 12078 
(Jan. 29, 1975). 
 206  See Sah & Loewenstein, supra note 156, at 578, 578 tbl.1 (finding that 
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 207  Christopher M. Gorman, Note, Are Chinese Walls the Best Solution to the 
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Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations to Institutional Investors, 2001 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1493, 1525.  
 208  Gorman, supra note 207, at 481 (“[B]roker-dealers seeking to maximize 
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adviser’s requirement, which does not necessarily list the average 
commission of two percent (2%), but only that the advisory fee is 
higher than average.209 The average should not be based on the type 
of product—for example, non-traded real estate investment trusts 
(“REITs”). Instead, the average should be based on the overall av-
erage commission for the broker-dealer. This is because products in 
the same category are likely to have similar commissions; therefore, 
disclosing the product-specific average would not necessarily put 
the investor on notice about the potential bias that may accompany 
the high commission unless the average commission for all products 
is disclosed210  
For instance, let us assume non-traded REITs typically offer a 
ten-percent (10%) commission, but a broker-dealer is recommend-
ing a particular non-traded REIT that offers a thirteen-percent (13%) 
commission. Telling the investor the average commission is ten per-
cent (10%) and this product offers a thirteen percent (13%) commis-
sion might seem normal. But if the broker-dealer’s average commis-
sion for all products is between six and seven percent (6–7%), and 
the broker-dealer discloses that she is making thirteen percent 
(13%), the investor can see the huge disparity and the potential in-
fluence the large commission is having.211 Investors need to be able 
to compare the average commission and the commission the broker-
dealer would earn on a particular product in order to see the full 
extent of their broker-dealer’s monetary incentive.  
This disclosure cannot just be buried in all the paperwork that an 
investor receives from a broker-dealer, or the investor will overlook 
the disclosure. Instead, I propose that at the time212 an investor re-
ceives any information about a particular security, the broker-dealer 
presents the investor with a tablet or similar device that lists this 
information. There are two reasons why I suggest the use of a tablet 
or similar device. First, one study found that subjects have a better 
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comprehension of what it is they are signing when the information 
is presented on an iPad as opposed to paper.213 Second, using a tablet 
can allow for the information to be presented in different formats.214 
For instance, even on a rudimentary program, such as Microsoft Ex-
cel, raw data can be transformed into any type of graph the viewer 
wishes. Presenting information in a way an individual prefers has 
been shown to significantly increase one’s understanding of risk.215 
CONCLUSION  
Dodd-Frank gave the SEC the authority to promulgate a rule ad-
dressing the regulatory regimes of broker-dealers and investment 
advisers. Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, the SEC proposed Regulation 
Best Interest that would require broker-dealers to act in the best in-
terests of their customers. Regulation Best Interest also includes var-
ious disclosure requirements, and essentially creates a fiduciary duty 
for broker-dealers similar to that of investment advisers. Likewise, 
in 2016 the DOL enacted its Fiduciary Rule, which required broker-
dealers to stand as fiduciaries when giving advice to retirement ac-
counts. Thus, Regulation Best Interest and the Fiduciary Rule re-
quire the same thing of broker-dealers—albeit the Fiduciary Rule is 
narrower in scope as it applies only to retirement advice. One can 
therefore assess the effects of Regulation Best Interest by drawing 
inferences from the effects of the Fiduciary Rule. 
A disclosure-based approach to broker-dealer reform should be 
preferred. In the wake of the Fiduciary Rule, a number of broker-
dealers shifted to fee-based accounts, which can have the adverse 
effect of squeezing out lower-capital investors. Therefore, the SEC 
should be cautious in enacting a rule that is similar to the Fiduciary 
Rule as one can expect the same effect. Indeed, this effect may be 
magnified given the broader scope of the proposed Regulation Best 
Interest. Instead, the SEC should consider a disclosure-based ap-
proach. This approach is a lighter regulatory load for broker-dealers 
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to bear and thus can mitigate, or even eradicate, the shift to fee-based 
accounts, allowing lower-capital investors to have access to mean-
ingful financial services. In addition,  studies show that investors 
can use the disclosure of conflicts of interest to make better invest-
ment decisions. Thus, a conflicts of interest disclosure requirement 
can provide meaningful regulatory reform.  
Still, disclosure alone is not enough. A broker-dealer’s conflict 
of interest disclosure should be simplified in a way that can easily 
be understood by investors. The disclosure should be provided in 
electronic form as it can allow investors to better understand the in-
formation they are reading, and can allow them to adjust the format 
of the information with the push of a button. The disclosure should 
also be presented in a way that enables investors to ascertain exactly 
how large of a conflict a broker-dealer has. This can be accom-
plished by presenting a broker-dealer’s commissions in a way that 
allows the investor to gauge how much the conflict may be affecting 
the broker-dealer’s recommendation. Borrowing from the invest-
ment adviser context, a broker-dealer’s commission and other remu-
neration should be listed as a percentage alongside the average per-
centage for all products available to the investor. This allows an in-
vestor to see how much a broker-dealer’s recommendation may be 
driven by her remuneration. 
